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KNOWLEDGE ASYMMETRY IN SHORT-TERM EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS: 
OPPORTUNISM INHIBITORS IN THE HIGHLY-SKILLED SECTOR OF IT 
MARKETPLACES 
Voutsina, Katerina, The Information Systems and Innovation Group, Department of 
Management, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London 
WC2A 2AE, UK, k.voutsina@lse.ac.uk 
Abstract 
The paper discusses the specific conditions under which the likelihood of contractual hazards is reduced 
and organizational equilibrium is ensured between the two parties of a contingent employment 
relationship: the highly-skilled contractor and his/her client-firm. In particular, it identifies the 
institutional norms, technical affordances, legal jurisdictions and social formations, as the conditions 
that appear to curb the potential of opportunistic behavior on behalf of the contractor and operate as 
stabilizers of the asymmetrical employment relationship.  
Keywords: contractual hazards, opportunism, knowledge workers, informal networks, reputation 
1 INTRODUCTION  
In today’s post-modern societies, labour loses its collective identity and becomes increasingly 
individualized and contingent in many of its manifestations. “The new social and economic organization 
aims at decentralizing management, individualizing work and customizing markets, segmenting work 
and fragmenting society” (Castells, 2000, p.5). Individuals and organizations can be imagined as nodes 
tied together in short-lived or enduring relationships or networks, which are brought together or kept 
apart according the prerequisites of emergent business projects. Stable and salaried employment 
declines, while contingent work arrangements proliferate across the globe. Professional services and 
highly skilled labor instead of being developed and provided inside the walls of the firm, tend to become 
more and more often an object of on-the-spot economic transactions between various market players 
(Barley and Kunda, 2004; Pollock and Williams, 2007).   
It is worth noticing that although highly-individualized forms of employee involvement and time-limited 
contracts are not  new, -they have always constituted standard hiring practices of low-skilled workers-, it 
is only the last few years that the latter have started governing the organization of highly-skilled or 
professional labor force. Interestingly enough, there are certain theoretical oppositions with reference 
to the feasibility and efficiency of contracting practices for knowledge workers or professionals  
(Goldthrope, 1998; Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; 1979). Professional or highly-skilled work is not 
subject to the managerial rationalization and control and as a result, it allows margins for opportunism 
exertion on behalf of the contractor. The asymmetry of knowledge between the two parties results to 
asymmetry of power which can be manifested in various and unpredictable ways. The question which 
arises is how the possibility of opportunism exertion on behalf of the highly-skilled contractor is curbed? 
How the notion of control and supervision is revised under the scope of ephemeral employment 
relationships? 
Aim of the current paper is to identify the activation of those mechanisms which account for  the 
opportunistic inclinations evasion and the rehabilitation of the balance between the highly-skilled IT and 
his/her hiring organization. In particular, focusing upon the working practices of highly-skilled IT 
contractors, it attempts to investigate how the aforementioned relationship is enacted in practice, 
overcoming the managers’ inability to control and supervise highly-skilled contractors.  
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The investigation is based on the analysis of qualitative data gathered from thirty interviews with IT 
professionals working as independent contractors in Greece. Highly-skilled IT contractors are always on 
the move, develop ephemeral types of relationships with heterogeneous groups of people, and are 
continuously called to perform their job in dissimilar organizational settings they are not acquainted 
with. A large part of the communication and interaction with their client-firms may take place in a 
virtual mode, while the actual performance of the task can be done remotely or in-house according to 
the special needs of the project. 
Analysis of the findings suggests that although the knowledge work of IT contractors is not subject to 
easy monitoring and immediate control, there are various conditions and mechanisms which alleviate 
the potential of opportunism exertion and counterbalance the asymmerty of knowledge and power that 
traditionally resides in the employment relationship.  
Institutional norms, technical affordances, legal jurisdictions and social formations appear to account for 
the balancing of the asymmetrical employment relationship and safeguard against the potential of 
opportunistic behaviour.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section briefly overviews the trends and controversies 
which delineate short-term employment relationships,  section three introduces the theoretical 
underpinnings of the analytical approach of the study, section four presents the research methododoly, 
section five presents the analysis of the empirical findings and the last section concludes the paper.   
2 THE GOVERNANCE OF SHORT-TERM CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS: TRENDS AND 
CONTROVERSIES 
Statistical data about part-time, temporary and self-employed workers (OECD, Carnoy, 2000), support 
the claim that there is a distinguishable trend in current workplace that dictates the declining of the 
standard employment patterns in favor of more flexible work arrangements.  Work tends to be 
organized as such (Carnoy, 2000): a) the working time schedule is not anymore as fixed as it used to be, 
35-40 hours a week is not anymore the case of the majority of workers, b) the location of the worker is 
not fixed within the narrow socio-spatial frames of old times. An increasing proportion of workers 
perform their tasks at home, on the move or at another organization that have under their direct 
responsibility, c) current work patterns are rather task-oriented or project-based. The work has been 
divided into its simplest components and has been organized into modules consisted of sub-tasks that 
can be easily detached from particular contexts and be assigned to people with small or no particular 
acquaintance with specific organizations (Kallinikos 2003), d) The social contract between the employee 
and the employer is no longer based on commitment by the employer to worker’s well-defined rights, 
standardized levels of compensation, social benefits and predictable career paths. The employee is 
condemned to live in a constant uncertainty, being always willing and available to offer the best quality 
of his services, no matter if that implies extra hours of work.      
Of particular interest is the fact that the aforementioned type of work organization (particularly, 
subcontracting and consulting) becomes more and more associated to the employment relationship 
that impinges upon professional work (Castells 2000; Matusik and Hill 1998; Laubacher and Malone 
1997; Tilly and Tilly, 1998;). In knowledge-intensive sectors of the economy, such as high technology and 
entertainment, highly-skilled workers operate outside the framework of traditional employment 
arrangements, as independent contractors, establishing ongoing relationships with a number of 
different firms (Laubacher and Malone, 1997).  “Stable employment is declining and contingent work is 
on the rise even among professionals and managers” (Barley 1996). Both organizations and high skilled 
employees seem to display a significant preference towards this kind of non-standard working 
arrangements each one for one’s own reasons.  
On the one hand, enterprises seem to desire and favor the use of contractors in order to decrease fixed 
costs and increase organizational flexibility. In that way they attempt to maximize their ability to 
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respond successfully and adapt quickly to the shifting demands of the market that current competitive 
forces impose (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Matusik and Hill, 1998). On the 
other hand, contingent workers and particular technical experts and professionals seem to prefer the 
possibility of flexibility, accumulation of general skills, experience, variety and wealth which is associated 
with the participation in diverse and simultaneous projects and tasks (Sullivan, 1999; Lawler and 
Finegold, 2000; Marler et al., 2002). Other scholars observed that technology contract workers liked 
working outside organizational boundaries because of the flexibility provided and the ability to keep 
themselves away from organizational politics, incompetence and inequities (Kunda et al., 2002).  It is not 
by chance that technical experts and professionals are considered to be the most rapidly growing 
segment of the contingent staffing industry (Lawler and Finegold, 2000; Zuboff  and Maxmin 2002; 
Castells 2000). 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the testified employment trends and perceived benefits, there is a 
significant body of the literature, rooted in transaction costs and agency theory, that challenges the 
feasibility and overall efficiency of contracting highly-skilled employees or professionals (Goldthrope, 
1998; Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; 1979). The nature of the job and the power associated with each 
job category make a lot of difference in terms of interpretation and understanding of the employment 
relationship.  
Highly-skilled or knowledge workers are an exceptional category of employees since contrary to the 
general notion of traditional salaried employee, it is them that possess and own the means of 
production. In this sense, they are much more reinforced than their co-employees since the 
management team is not always in position to intervene and judge their work. “Professions are 
occupations with special power and prestige…based on special competence in esoteric bodies of 
knowledge linked to central needs and values of the social system” (Larson 1977). The client-firm hires a 
knowledge worker to act in the organization’s interest under circumstances where control and 
supervision are rather difficult to apply (Goldthrope, 1998). 
Taking the above into consideration, the paper opts to identify the conditions that allow contigent 
employment relationships to be sustained and spread in the highly-skilled sector of IT marketplaces. If 
we take for granted the inability of management to exert control over the execution of professional IT 
work, what are the alternative mechanisms which safeguard for the balance of the contingent 
relationship? 
3 INHIBITORS OF THE POTENTIAL OF OPPORTUNISM EXERTION 
To frame our conceptual problem, we draw upon Sharma’s analysis of the knowledge asymmetry 
occuring between the professional agent and his/her employing organization.  
In particular, Sharma’ s analytical model (1997) presents specific conditions under which the likelihood 
of contractual hazards is reduced. It identifies four conditions/factors that curb opportunistic behavior 
and operate as stabilizers of the principal-agent  relationship: 1) self-control, 2) community control, 3) 
bureaucratic control and 4) client control.  
1) self-control and  identity 
Sharma (1997) questions the assumption of self-interest and remarks that professional agents “are 
driven by a complexity of motives that include not only self-preservation but also pride in the craft and a 
calling to serve the public” (Sharma, 1997, p. 775).   
More precisely, people attached to the IS profession seem to have some extreme differences in 
comparison with other occupational groups (Scarbrough, 1999; Couger et al., 1979).  A survey on the 
career progression of IS professionals reports that IS jobs that are characterized by creativity and 
challenge, that allow individuals to make their own technical decisions, that are capable of providing “a 
sense of accomplishment and that allow one to do a variety of tasks and to see them through to the 
completion with reasonable autonomy, have a strong appeal for high achievers” (Smits et al., 1993, p. 
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114). Along with the aforementioned findings, Barley and Kunda (2001) commenting on IT contractors’ 
behavior, note that whenever the latter seek or decide to accept a contract, “the identity of the 
organization in which the project is located, is generally secondary to personal and professional 
considerations, ranging from hourly rates to opportunities for learning new skills, to the intrinsic 
challenge of work itself” (Barley and Kunda, 2001, p. 79). 
IT experts are also said to be characterized by a high need for feedback, recognition and autonomy 
(Scarbrough, 1999). It is important for them to know that their efforts are vital in achieving outcomes 
and that their ideas and actions are instrumental in performing the overall job well. Due to the fact that 
managers lack the specialized knowledge that would allow them to give IT subordinates directions about 
how to perform their job, it is extremely important for employees to have the autonomy and freedom to 
act as they wish. Along the same lines, other studies on IT contractors’ behavior and working experience 
(Kunda et al., 2002) reveal that  there is a significant amount of perceived benefits that induce IT experts 
to enter the contingent labor market. The sense of autonomy felt at work, the opportunity to develop 
new marketable skills and experience diverse working environments, the increased control over one’s 
working time and work-life balance, high pay rates, and the possibility of escaping from the politics and 
inequalities of organizational life (Kunda et al., 2002) make contracting seem appealing to IT experts.  
2) community control 
Another restraint on a potential opportunistic behavior could be the acknowledgement that any devious 
and deceitful course of action undertaken by the professional agent might bring about incorrigible 
damage in his/her reputation within the broader market and the professional community. “Unless an 
agent does not intend to remain in business beyond one transaction, or unless the principal has a short 
memory or is of a forgiving kind, concern about reputation and potential for future business inhibits 
opportunistic behavior” (Sharma, 1997, p. 778).  
IT engineering as an occupation is characterized by many heterogeneous conditions. Although it is based 
on technical expertise, IT engineering cannot be considered as a typical “profession”, since its members 
could not “claim a distinctive and valued social identity, share a common perspective toward the 
mission and the practices of the occupation, and take part in a sort of interactive fellowship that 
transcends the work place (Van Maanen and Barley, 1984). Although world-wide, there are IT 
associations which prescribe a Code of Conduct and aim at setting out the professional standards for 
this occupation, these associations do not seem to possess the universality of power and control that 
professional associations traditionally enjoy. 
3) bureaucratic control 
Apart from individual motives and concerns about reputation within the market and peer communities, 
“restraints on opportunistic inclinations also arise from the nature of the internal structure and 
systems” of the client-firm (Sharma, 1997, p. 781). Drawing upon the notion of “administrative elite”, 
initially introduced by Freidson (1986), Sharma (1997) assumes that the professional agent will behave 
less opportunistically, as long as the client-firm hires expert-superordinate supervisors. Alongside this 
argument, Eisenhardt (1989) states that the board of directors might be used as a monitoring device 
which ensures the alignment of the stockholders’ interests with the knowledge workers’ interests.  
As already mentionned before, due to the nature of IT engineering work, the employing organization is 
not usually in a position to estimate and evaluate the specialized contractor’s work. The possibility of 
monitoring and the ease of control seem to be rather dependent upon the type of work project 
outsourced.  
4) client control 
Whenever the client-firm is “unable even to design agreements in which agents’ compensation is based 
on the outcome of efforts” (Sharma, 1997, p. 783), it has to find alternative ways to curve the problems 
arising from knowledge asymmetries. Sharma (1997) argues that one might identify two possible 
strategic choices that would protect the firm from an agent’s opportunism: a) the client-firm could 
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fragment the project into very small sub-projects and assign each one of them to independent 
contractors or b) the client-firm could hire external specialists who are quite knowledgeable about the 
contractors’ work and could exert significant control over it. This is how the firm attempts to internalize 
specialized knowledge and lessen its vulnerability to agents’ opportunism. Nevertheless, such a 
utilization of these “external specialists” would raise the monitoring costs of the contract and might 
possibly trigger a sequence of questions regarding their utility to the overall efficiency of the project. 
In the IT industry, the practice of “project management” (i.e. definition of “milestones” and well-
specified “deliverables”) seems to be widespread among organizations which have frequent interactions 
with IT contractors. Moreover, the terms of the contract regarding how the contractor will be paid 
might possibly be used as a medium to curve the contractor’s opportunistic inclinations. Mayer and 
Nickerson (2005, p. 229) argue that if the contract compensates the contractor “with a predetermined 
fee in exchange for his or her services, the contractor will have incentives to get the job done as quickly 
and inexpensively as possible, so as to increase their  profit margin. If the contractor is compensated 
with a cost-plus or hourly wage contract, then the incentives to shrink might be weaken.  
In the following sections, the paper presents the extent to which the aforementioned 
conditions/assumptions are met or redefined through the lenses of highly-skilled IT contractor’s working 
experience. 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The analysis is based on data gathered through thirty interviews with IT highly-skilled workers or 
professionals working as independent contractors in Greece. Eight out of the thirty interviewees, were 
general IT consultants and managers. Five of the interviewees had highly specialized skills in a very 
particular technology or commercial off-the-shelf software package such as those manufactured by SAP 
(www.sap.com). The remaining 17 interviewees were specialized in a wider range of technologies. All of 
the interviewees had university degrees in computer science or related subjects and all had at least five 
years work experience. The interviews (semi-structured, “ethnographic interviews”, Kunda et al, 2002)  
were conducted in the period between autumn 2005 and autumn 2007 and each of them lasted from 
one hour and a half to two hours. Some informants have been interviewed twice, whenever the initial 
transcription of their sayings rendered necessary a second round of interview in order certain issues to 
be further clarified and explained. 
Given that there is no an established classification of IT individuals who work as free-lancers, the 
selection of informants was not a straight-forward process (Voutsina et al., 2007). Informants were 
selected from a list of the Federation of Greek IS enterprises and IS personnel, following the logic of a 
snowball sampling, i.e., respondents were asked to provide details of others they deemed interesting for 
the study (Evans et al. 2004; Faugier and Sargeant, 1997).  
The respondents were asked to describe their lived work experiences stemming from their engagement 
to short-term employment relationships. Attention was paid in the practicalities and risks that underlie 
the contingent relationship between the IT contractor and his/her client-firm.  Focusing upon the way IT 
contractors interpret and appropriate this employment relationship, the interviews corpus aimed at 
identifying the conditions which curb the potential of  opportunistic behaviour and allow the contingent 
employment relashionship to be sustained and spread.    
5 ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS  
5.1 Self-control 
Consistent to the findings of previous studies (Kunda et al, 2002, Barley and Kunda, 2004) many of the 
interviewees –especially the older ones who had worked for years in large corporations- noted that their 
choice to become contractors was a deliberate one. It was a conscious decision that would allow them 
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to escape from the irrationalities of the corporate life. Pursuing challenging projects, enjoying 
reasonable autonomy in the way work is performed, gaining control over their working time and finding 
a meaning in the work itself were listed as primary considerations for highly-skilled Greek IT contractors.  
Their decision to enter the contracting labour force was also reinforced by the specific economic 
conditions occurring in the Greek IS sector in 2000. Considerably big amounts of money were diffused  
in the Greek economy by the European Union in an attempt to promote IT innovation in small and 
medium-sized companies. The demand for IS personnel increased radically, opportunities for 
challenging work raised and fees for highly-skilled IT work skyrocketed. Many small and medium sized IT 
companies have been formed and started competing against big names of the IT industry (i.e. IBM). Yet, 
the massive introduction of big IT companies in the Athens Stock Exchange and the radical increase of 
their share and capital turned upside down the Greek IT sector. Big IT companies bought many of the 
small and medium sized IT companies. A series of mergers and acquisitions took place without any 
careful planning or thorough analysis of the upcoming changes. Further to the above, the sudden fall of 
stock prices in the Athens Stock Exchange resulted in the bankruptcy of various organizations and 
triggered surges of unemployment. Under these conditions, highly skilled IT executives were found to be 
caught within the nets of a chaotic organizational life. Increased uncertainty, corporate politics and 
inefficiencies made the talented personnel to suffocate and look for alternative careers and work 
opportunities.  
Having experienced the negative aspects of corporate life almost at its extreme made highly-skilled IT 
personnel to re-estimate its value-system and consciously be turned towards contracting. To them 
contracting was an opportunity to regain control over their work and their time. In the Greek IT 
contractors’ eyes the possibility of opportunism seemed both non-desirable and non-existent.  
5.2 Community control: Professional identity, reputation and normative control mechanisms 
Although contractors chose to enter the contracting world in order to “gain “independence and distance 
from the irrationalities of organizational life” (Kunda et al, 2002), they were soon faced with a new 
burden: the sense of professional isolation and perpetual insecurity. Developing only short-term 
employment relationships with the client-firms, contractors were considered to be “outsiders who claim 
double of the money than the money earned by a permanent employee in an equivalent position”. IT 
freelancers are usually employed to accomplish a very specific task for a short period of time and their 
contact with the organization is limited to few meetings with the manager or the technical supervisor of 
the project. Sometimes, there is only one initial meeting with the above individuals and the rest of 
communication is taking place on-line. The level of task interdependency between the contractor and 
the firm’s employees as well as the need or not of physical proximity depends on the degree of project 
complexity. Interestingly enough, even when the contractor works at the premises of the client-firm, 
his/her interaction with the permanent staff is kept to the minimal and the pressure on him/her to 
display “knowledge” to others and persuade for his/her skill is immense.   
Apart from feeling socially isolated, IT contractors have also to take into account a number of serious 
problems related to their professional training and career advancement. There is no anymore an 
employing organization responsible for their professional training and career planning. It is up to them 
to keep themselves “marketable and technically up-to-date” (Kunda et al, 2002).  
To manage all the above unpleasant practicalities of free-lancing, IT experts engaged themselves in the 
following activities: a) they formed networks of relationships with ex-peers/ friends who share the same 
professional interests and deal  with the provision of similar or supplementary IT services, and b) 
participated in diverse kinds of virtual IT communities (user groups, web forums specialized on specific 
technologies, etc.).  
According to the respondents’ testimonies, virtual communities and informal networks among peers 
constituted the virtual places where IT contractors with common interests and concerns gather regularly 
to “trade stories and share advice” (Laubacher and Malone, 1997, p.5) about technical problems they 
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were puzzled about. For instance, two of the interviewees who were specialized in SAP solutions were 
members of an informal group of 50 SAP-contractors who have been working in the wider area of 
Europe. Through a common project, they had met a former member of the group who introduced them 
to the overall group. The members of this group are electronically connected via a kind of intranet, 
share their experiences and support each other on a daily basis. Twice a year they organize a training 
seminar among themselves and have the chance to interact face-to-face, as well. 
This kind of informal groups and virtual networks are considered as dynamic repositories of knowledge, 
where learning occurs when a node of the network -an IT contractor-mobilizes the network in order to 
find out specific information about a technical problem s/he is supposed to resolve.  Bearing in mind 
that a) the” technical knowledge is encoded in and transferred through the narratives that technicians 
recount for themselves and each other” (Barley and Kunda, 2001), b) IT contractors cannot be turned to 
the client-staff to ask for advice or help, these communities constituted the contractors’ sole chance to 
stay technically competent. 
These networks apart from being a dynamic repository of knowledge and timely technical support, they 
operated as triggers of job placement in the market. Through them, IT experts build their reputation and 
render themselves more capable in being continuously employed for a prolonged periods of time. Simon 
and March (1958) note that the greater the range of contacts in diverse organizations an individual has, 
the more visible s/he is in the market and the more visible are the existing alternatives to him/her. 
Moreover, the greater the reputation of an IT expert about his/her uniqueness of skills and high status 
is, the greater the number of organizations that will desire to collaborate with him/her. The 
interviewees who had worked at some point in their career as employees of large multi-national 
companies, were keeping their membership in the Club-of-Multinational “X” Hellas and through it they 
were connected to huge pool of executives who were moving across various corporations (in large 
multinationals like Johnson Hellas, the rate of  turnover of executives/employees is very high). Access to 
people in various corporations increased the possibility of new future  contracts. 
Additionally, due to the fact that the employing organization is no longer the primary source of 
occupational identity nor an object of emotional attachment (Barley and Kunda, 2004), IT contractors 
feel the need to redefine their relationship with the current workplace. The virtual communities and 
informal networks become for them the locus of social interaction and the object of professional 
identification (Laubacher and Malone, 1997). The needs of acceptance, belonging and socializing were 
largely covered through these informal social formations.  
Interestingly, members of these informal groups tend to have the characteristics of the members of 
clans (Ouchi, 1980). The members are tied together through bonds of reciprocity and trust, share 
mutually defined goals and have internalized the same norms and values. “Through social interaction, 
contract professionals constitute a culture with informal expectations for participation and standards for 
occupational practice. Adherence to cultural codes and norms marks practitioners as occupational 
members in good standing” (Osnowitz, 2006). A highly-skilled contractor may choose to behave in a 
reliable way towards the client-firm, because such a behavior is consistent with his/her identity as a 
“good colleague”, “real professional”, and such a behavior is applauded by the members of the 
community. Moreover, when an IT contractor is introduced by a member of his/her professional 
network to a prospective client-firm, s/he is expected to behave reliably, performing the assigned task in 
the most efficient possible way. This was originally the very logic underlying the formation of these 
networks: circulation of accurate and trustworthy information (Granovetter, 1985) among peers and 
prospective client-firms. And gaining legitimacy in the eyes of clients and peers involved the adoption of 
behavioral patterns and the employment of particular practices which were dictated by the 
occupational norms of the community and expanded beyond the technical standards of a high-quality 
task performance.  
In the eyes of the community members and prospective clients, this kind of legitimacy has mostly relied 
upon the past record of business interactions and cooperation the contractor has had with other firms 
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and individuals. It is closely related to the notion of reputation. In particular, it mostly has to do with the 
way people make sense and perceive the quality and reliability of work and the overall professional 
conduct of the freelancer. The reputation that the freelancer builds around his/her name is manifested 
in the everyday discourse of the business world and is widely spread across the market. The connectivity 
of organizations brought about by the extended use of ICTs, as well as the frequent mobility of 
individuals across organizational borders, has rendered the trajectory of the IT contractor as visible as 
ever before. And this transparency and visibility accounts significantly for the contractor’s future 
employability and positioning in the market. 
Information about IT contractors circulates so quickly and spreads so widely through the professional 
networks among former and current business partners and agents (including individuals, organizations 
and staffing agencies) that the exposition of a kind of unreliable or amateurish behavior on behalf of a 
freelancer - even if it were only once - could irreversibly destroy his/her career.  
In conclusion, it can be argued that the IT contractors’ behavior is largely influenced by the her/his 
struggle to build a coherent identity, stay technically up-todate and secure continuous employability. In 
their attempt to do so, the contractors find themselves attached  to social and virtual networks. These 
networks constitute a point of reference according to which individuals make sense of their 
occupational identity and operate as a buffer against the possibilities of social isolation and occupational 
insecurity, inherent characteristics of the freelancing work. It is the internalization of norms - which 
happens through past social interaction among members of these communities (Granovetter, 1985), 
and the extended transparency of members’ professional trajectories, brought about by the use of 
mobile and internet technologies - that account for and guide the independent contractors’ behaviors.  
5.3 Bureaucratic and client control: The labor contract and the rationale of project management 
Apart from identity related issues and reputation related concerns, the contract itself  is regarded as a 
prescriptive mechanism of the contractor’s behavior. According to the respondents’ views the contract –
the milestone of bureaucratic organizational forms and the industrial era (Perrow, 1986)- constitutes a 
substantial coordinator and regulator of the economic transaction between them and the client-firm. 
The specific terms and jurisdictions anticipated in it, no matter how abstract or concrete they might be, 
delineate the general landscape within which the two parties may legitimately assert their demands and 
fulfill their obligations, respectively. 
Once signed by the two parties, the contract is submitted to and certified by the financial authorities of 
the Greek government. It constitutes a formal legal document. If the behavior of any of the two parties 
deviates from the terms of the contract, they are accountable to the court of justice.  
Although, the possibility to estimate the intensity of the effort allocated in the work task or define the 
detailed steps of the production process is rather absent (IT professional work resists managerial 
rationalization), the creation of an outcome-based contract (Goldthorpe, 1998) can support the smooth 
running of the employment relationship. What the final product or service will be, when it will be 
delivered and at what price are usually the terms of the contract that both parties have to agree upon in 
and stick to.  
Apart from the above basic terms,  most of the spot-contracts signed by the client-firm and the IT 
contractor apply the rationale and vocabulary of project management. The project is broken down into 
smaller independent subprojects, which are meant to be completed sequentially and be delivered 
(deliverables) over the contract duration on specific pre-set dates (milestones). The principles of project 
management aim at: 1) increasing the visibility of an obscure  production process through the 
identification of sub-products which jointly constitute the overall software application and 2) enhancing 
control over the completion pace of the project assigned, so as to ensure that the time deadlines often 
settled by the competitive pressure of the market will be met. The provision of timely, functional and 
efficient IT services is considered to lie at the heart of freelancing and sub-contracting. The increased 
modularization of the software production paved the way for such division of labor to happen.  
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 Interestingly enough, in the world of Greek IT contractors, the tight coupling between effort 
intensification, superior performance and long hours of work tends to fade. Although the pace of 
professional and highly-skilled work cannot be measured or estimated, long hours of work used to be a 
necessity for professionals and consultants as a signal of visibility and commitment towards the 
employing organization (Evans et al., 2004; Perlow, 1997b). Nevertheless in the project-based boundary-
less careers followed by IT experts, the expected time for the completion of tasks is often related to 
factors other than the complexity of the task itself. For instance, client-firms, according to their 
organizational idiosyncrasies and sectoral competition, display particular preferences with reference to 
the time frames of project completion. What interests them is the timely acquisition of highly-
functional, customized software solutions, given the relatively predefined budget. The actual effort - in 
terms of time - allocated by the contractor to the assigned project seems to escape managerial 
attention and interest. In the same respect, the pricing of contracting services is primarily influenced by 
the available budget of the firm and the prices charged for identical kinds of work by key players in the 
IT market. A quick search in the internet provides a good image of the IT services available in the market 
and the corresponding rates. The norm for the Greek IT sector is that the independent IT contractors 
charge for their services half of the fee charged by big IT warehouses. A well-established reputation 
justifies the provision of highly-rated services. In a free-market, an IT expert who has developed a 
unique skill in building a particular kind of software application and who can re-use a large proportion of 
ready made components across different contexts, can claim high rates for his/her services even if the 
actual effort s/he puts forth in every new application is quite limited.  
Finally, drawing on the respondents recounted stories, it appears that numerous Greek client-firms tend 
to have repeated relationships with contractors with whom they had a good record of previous 
cooperation. The possibility of a contract for support or maintenance makes it too costly for a contractor 
to engage in unreliable modes of behavior. “Individuals with whom one has a continuing relation have 
an economic motivation to be trustworthy, so as not to discourage future transactions” (Granovetter, 
1985, p. 490). Taking into account the above remarks, it is worth noting is that in some cases, the 
recurrent character of spot employment relationships calls for the emergence of intermediate 
organizational forms which appear to lie between the market and hierarchy. Economic transactions and 
employment relationships often take place within the complex webs of social contour, where coercive 
and normative methods of control co-exist with, substitute or complement one another. 
6 CONCLUSION 
The current paper argues that the alleviation of the inherent controversies (knowledge and power 
asymmetry, inability of immediate control and supervision, great potential of opportunism exertion) 
met in the short-term employment relationship between the highly-skilled IT contractor and his/her 
client-firm is better understood against the background of specific institutional norms, technical 
affordances, legal jurisdictions and social formations. 
The IT contractor’s behavior is largely influenced by his/her struggle to build a coherent identity within a 
rather heterogeneous and scattered working environment and his/her attempt to ensure his/her future 
employability. To pursue the above aims, s/he founds herself/himself attached to informal networks and 
interactive virtual fellowships which constitute the main body of professional identification and catalyst 
of behavior formulation. Adherence to cultural codes and norms marks practitioners as 
“good”occupational members and as a consequence, it widens their prospects of on-going 
employability, further knowledge updating and collegiality/camaraderie. Extended use of the internet 
and the possibilities of transparency alongside with it pave the way for the creation of “panopticon-like” 
structures which allow for the monitoring of individual trajectories, too. Finally, alongside with the 
normative and technology-mediated regulators of contractors’ behavior, formal institutional 
arrangements, like the type of contract and division of labor techniques, operate as a coordination 
means that safeguard the smooth running of the contingent employment relationship. In the current 
boundary-free working environment, professional agents’ actions emerge in response to socio-technical 
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and economic contingencies, and not so much as a result to an abstract, generalized morality or 
conformance to some kind of formally established professional standards. 
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